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Psychology

An Investigation of the Effects of Depressive-Rumination on Prospective Memory
Chairperson: Craig McFarland
Depression is related to prospective memory (PM) impairment. However, the research on
depression-related PM impairment remains inconclusive. No study to date has taken into
account the possible effects of depressive-rumination, which is known to impair
executive functions underlying PM. The current study addresses this gap in the literature.
Participants: Participants were grouped according to self-reported depression severity per
the Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II). Fifty-five individuals with low
(BDI-II < 8), 17 individuals with moderate (BDI-II 9-18), and 16 individuals with high
(BDI-II > 19) symptoms of depression were included in the study. Method: Participants
completed demographic and trait and state rumination questionnaires. Participants within
each group were then randomly assigned to either a rumination or distraction condition.
Following this manipulation, participants completed a modified version of the Memory
for Intentions Test. Results: Regardless of depression severity, inducted state rumination
had no effect on PM. In addition, depression severity was unrelated to both event- and
time-based PM trials, and overall PM performance. Interestingly, trait rumination was
negatively correlated with overall PM performance in the low group compared to the
moderate group, wherein trait rumination was positively correlated with overall PM
performance. Trait rumination was not correlated with overall PM performance in the
high depressive symptom group. Conclusion: The current study failed to demonstrate
depression-related PM impairment as a function of depressive-rumination. Furthermore,
depression severity had no effect on overall PM performance. The positive correlation
between trait rumination and overall PM performance in the moderate group offers some
support for the positive benefits of rumination among people experiencing sub-clinical
depression proposed by Albiński et al., 2012. Results from the current study should be
interpreted with caution given the small sample size and low statistical power. Further
research is needed to elucidate the effects of depressive-rumination on PM.
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People make plans to achieve challenging goals, meet important deadlines, attend
appointments, and many other significant or mundane undertakings situated in the future.
Such plans and intentions illustrate a form of remembering known as prospective memory
(PM). Prospective memory refers to the capacity to make and execute plans at a future
point in time.
Event- and Time-Based Prospective Memory
Prospective memory tasks take one of two forms—event- and time-based—that
can be distinguished by the type of environmental cues that indicate whether it is
appropriate to complete a previously formed intention. Event-based PM cues represent
situations where the intention to remember is embedded within the context of the task at
hand. For example, in laboratory settings, a person may be asked to perform a particular
action (e.g., press a red key) when a distinct event occurs (e.g., the presence of a specific
word) while he or she rates a series of words presented on a computer screen (e.g.,
Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001). In naturalistic or everyday settings, eventbased PM may be conceptualized as remembering to relay a message to a co-worker the
next time this co-worker is encountered. Such PM tasks are considered less demanding of
higher-level self-initiated processes (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Here, the prospective
remembering operates more passively as the intention is generally recalled when a
specific external stimulus is encountered.
In contrast, time-based PM cues are specific to either a particular point in time or
after a certain amount of time has elapsed. Like event-based PM, time-based PM is a
common everyday occurrence. For instance, college students constantly prepare for or
procrastinate assignments that are due at a future point in time. The timeliness of when
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these assignments are submitted is critical, for students may be penalized for late
submissions. Studies investigating time-based PM often ask people to perform a specified
action at different time intervals (e.g., after two minutes) or at a specific time during the
day (e.g., five o’clock). Regardless of the events and times associated with PM, this
aspect of memory is distinct from, though not entirely independent of, retrospective
memory—the related capacity to recall past events and experiences (Burgess & Shallice,
1997; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Kvavilashvili, 1987).
Prospective and Retrospective Memory
Successful PM requires both the remembrance of what actions have to be
performed and when such actions are to be carried out (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996).
Accessing the content of a particular memory (i.e., the what) represents the retrospective
component of PM. Despite possessing a retrospective component, PM does not rely
solely on the capacity to recall the contents of a particular memory.
What makes PM unique and distinct from retrospective memory is that the
memory retrieval process is rarely prompted by external sources (Einstein & McDaniel,
1996). Retrospective remembering is elicited by an external source, which then initiates a
search for some past event or experience needed for the present. For instance, a lawyer
may directly question a witness about where she or he was at the time of a crime. Here,
the lawyer directly prompts the witness to search for the relevant information. In contrast,
prospective memory does not rely upon explicit external prompts that direct retrieval
activities, such as direct questioning as in the example above. Einstein and McDaniel
(1996) refer to PM as being a spontaneous process in the sense that it can occur without
explicit guidance from external sources. This is not to say that PM is an unconscious or
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involuntary reaction to environmental stimuli. Rather, PM is an active self-generated
process because the environmental stimuli associated with a future-orientated intention
may offer relatively weak, indirect retrieval prompts. For example, event- and time-based
cues, if identified as relevant to a previously formed intention, do not necessarily call the
intention to mind. Instead, one often needs to search anew for a specific intention after
first recalling that an intention had been made. Here, the individual may need to actively
search for what is to be done in response to some meaningful cue, be it an event or a
specific time. Furthermore, this active retrieval for a PM interrupts a person’s stream of
consciousness while he or she is engaged in some ongoing activity. This distinction has
important implications for the theoretical underpinnings of PM.
In his seminal work explaining age-related deficits in memory, Craik (1986)
proposed that the very nature of PM requires self-initiated mental activities given that the
external cues themselves often do not lend sufficient activation of the intended action.
Certain environmental cues are assumed to provide a marker of remembrance for what is
to be done and when. However, such external markers are considered weak retrieval
generators because they lend minimal environmental support to remember, which is why
the individual must initiate the process of remembering (Craik, 1986). In addition, cues
specific to time offer little, if any, memory retrieval assistance. The quality of such cues
may be best conceptualized as implicit. In contrast, cues for retrospective memory recall
are explicit and direct, increasing the efficiency of retrieval processes. Thus, according to
Craik’s (1986) taxonomy of memory, PM requires a greater amount of self-initiated
processing of environmental cues than retrospective memory.
Prospective Memory and Executive Function
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The ability to make plans intended for the future, especially those that are
associated with a specific point in time, depends upon a set of mental operations known
as executive functions (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008). Executive functions are higher-level
cognitive processes that allow organisms to adjust behavior in light of new information
and adapt to changing demands in their environments in order to optimize functioning.
Examples of executive functions include behaviors ranging from overriding learned
stereotyped behaviors (i.e., inhibiting learned behaviors) to developing new solutions to
various problems. Whereas non-executive functions are generally thought to reflect
automatic processing, executive functions are thought to reflect controlled mental
operations. This is most apparent when a certain behavior is needed in the absence of a
clear stimulus-response association and highlights the self-initiated processes of
executive functioning. Given the nature of PM, specifically the absence of a memoryeliciting stimulus, PM constitutes an executive function (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008) and is
in line with Craik’s (1986) theory of PM, which asserts that self-initiated processing is
critical for PM.
Research has consistently related executive functions to the frontal lobes of the
cortex (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008). Recent research also demonstrates a relationship
between frontal lobe functioning and PM performance, with low frontal lobe functioning
being negatively correlated with PM performance (McFarland & Glisky, 2009;
McFarland & Glisky, 2011). However, it is important to note that the term “executive
function” is used liberally and is not a unitary construct (Alavares & Emory, 2006; Stuss
& Alexander, 2000). In other words, evidence suggests that impairments in executive
functioning depends on the nature and extent of frontal lobe damage (and other regions;
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e.g., parietal lobes) as well as the executive functioning domain in question (e.g.,
inhibition; Alavares & Emory, 2006; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; Stuss & Alexander, 2000).
This holds true for PM research as well, which has recently localized certain aspects of
PM to specific regions located in the frontal lobes (Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, & Volle,
2011).
Executive functioning in event- and time-based prospective memory.
Considerable evidence links event- and time-based PM performance to various
aspects of executive functioning. Marsh and Hicks (1998) conducted five experiments to
address the underlying cognitive processes that influence event-based PM. In their study,
Marsh and Hicks (1998) noted that successful PM performance was strongly related to
both monitoring and planning executive processes. For instance, participants who failed
to actively monitor their performance and adapt their behavior to new environmental cues
exhibited poorer event-based PM. According to Marsh and Hicks (1998) event-based PM
requires, to an extent, intact executive functioning. More specifically, they argue that
event-based PM relies upon central executive processing—a unique executive function
system dedicated to the control and appropriate allocation of attentional resources
(Baddeley, 1983, 1986). In their model, central executive processing facilitates PM
through active monitoring of cue-appropriate stimuli that, when recognized, activates a
search for the stored intention for PM, which is then readily brought to mind.
Similarly, McDaniel, Glisky, Rubin, Guynn, and Routhieaux (1999) found that
older adults characterized as possessing low frontal lobe functioning performed more
poorly on an event-based PM task. Specifically, the PM impairment in that study was
related to executive functioning deficits in encoding-planning processes and the ability to
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inhibit responses to ongoing activities in order to perform the PM task. Regarding frontal
lobe involvement, Simons, Scholvinck, Gilbert, Frith, and Burgess (2006) used fMRI to
determine the locality of two key components of event-based PM—cue identification and
intention retrieval (McDaniel & Einstein, 1992; as cited in Simons et al., 2006)—and
found that activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC) was related to both cue
identification and intention retrieval. In addition, they found that the lateral PFC may be
more specific to the retrieval of the PM intention whereas the medial PFC is related to
PM cue identification. The involvement of the PFC and its associated executive
functions, specifically planning and cognitive flexibility, appear to play an important role
in event-based PM and lend support to the multi-phasic process model proposed by
(Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002).
The multi-phasic process model conceptualizes PM using four distinct
components: (1) intention formation, (2) maintenance of intention, (3) initiation of
intended action, and (4) execution of the intention (Kliegel et al., 2002). Each component
is largely dependent upon several key aspects of executive functioning. According to this
model, planning is critical for the intention formation phase of PM and is a key feature of
executive functioning. Retrospective memory is most strongly related to maintaining the
PM intention and was unrelated to the other measures of executive functioning, lending
support for the argument that PM performance cannot be explained solely by
retrospective memory. Regarding the final two components of the multi-phasic model—
initiation of the intended action and execution of the intention—indices of cognitive
flexibility and problem solving were both crucial for successful PM performance, with
cognitive flexibility being the strongest predictor of the execution component.
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In a related follow-up study investigating the involvement of frontal lobeexecutive involvement in PM, Martin, Kliegel, and McDaniel (2003) found additional
support for the involvement of executive functioning indices (i.e., planning, monitoring,
and cognitive flexibility) in successful PM performance on both event- and time-based
PM tasks among young and older adults. Furthermore, performance on measures of
executive functioning served as the strongest predictor of PM performance in comparison
to other potentially relevant variables such as age, education, and retrospective memory.
Thus, there is strong support for a link between executive functioning and successful PM
performance.
Factors Influencing Prospective Memory
Prospective memory performance can be influenced by a variety of factors.
Several of these factors are thought to negatively affect PM because they place additional
demands upon executive functioning. These factors include cue focality and strategic
monitoring as evidenced by ongoing task performance and clock monitoring.
Cue focality.
The environmental cues associated with planned future intentions can influence
the execution of future intentions. Environmental cues associated with event-based PM
cues are categorized as either focal or non-focal (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Focal cues
represent stimuli that are embedded within the design of the ongoing tasks and associated
with the PM task. For example, the PM task may require participants to perform a
behavior whenever the letter ‘e’ is presented in an ongoing task that requires participants
to determine which of two presented words contains more vowels (e.g. Altgassen,
Kliegel, & Martin, 2009). Given that the PM cue (i.e., the letter ‘e’) is embedded within
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and processed as part of the ongoing task, it is assumed that such cue types facilitate
more automatic retrieval of the PM intention.
In contrast, non-focal cues are those that are not integral to the performance of the
ongoing task. For instance, sticking with the previous example in which the ongoing task
requires participants to count and compare the number of ‘e’ vowels in two
simultaneously presented words, a PM task that requires participants to perform a
specific behavior when one of the words is a verb would represent a non-focal cue.
Because successful execution of the ongoing task (i.e., counting vowels) does not require
semantic processing (i.e., distinguishing verbs from nouns or adjectives), identification
and classification of a word as a verb demands additional unrelated processing. For that
reason, such cues are assumed to draw upon more strategic attentional resources,
requiring greater self-initiated effort because the cue is not processed at the level required
by the ongoing task.
Strategic monitoring.
Event-based monitoring.
The self-initiated effort to actively search for the appropriate cue is often referred
to as strategic monitoring (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). A major assumption in the
strategic monitoring model is that portions of attentional resources are consciously
employed by the individual in an effort to detect PM related cues that will facilitate
remembering. Monitoring in the context of event-based PM tasks is evidenced by
ongoing task performance, specifically response time (RT). For instance, Smith (2003)
found that people performing a delayed intention (i.e. PM) took longer to respond to the
ongoing task activities than when completing an ongoing task in isolation. The slowing of
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RTs observed when participants complete both an ongoing task and a PM task is assumed
to signify active monitoring because the individual is allocating attention toward other
stimuli unrelated to the purpose of the ongoing task. Furthermore, Smith (2003) found
that slower RTs were related to increased PM performance suggesting successful
prospective remembering will come at the cost of ongoing task performance, and
indicates that event-based PM requires, at the very least, some attentional resources.
More recently, Albiński, Sedek, and Kliegel (2012a) found evidence suggesting
that individual differences exist in strategic monitoring when both the ongoing task and
PM targets demanded more higher-order executive processing. After classifying
participants based on their ongoing task performance RTs as either monitors or
nonmonitors (slower RTs), Albiński, et al. (2012a) found that young and middleaged/older adult nonmonitors performed more poorly on the event-based PM task than
their monitoring counterparts. Taken together, it appears that when the current task is
demanding and event-based PM cues require more self-initiated processing (i.e., nonfocal), people actively monitor their environments in order to facilitate PM retrieval,
which comes at the expense of ongoing task performance.
Time-based monitoring.
The frequency at which people monitor time during time-based PM tasks provides
additional insight into the mechanisms underlying PM performance. Time monitoring is
assumed to reflect the allocation of attentional and cognitive control resources that are
necessary for time-based PM (Mioni & Stablum, 2013; Schnitzspahn et al., 2014) and
research suggests that time monitoring is critical for successful time-based PM
performance (Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, &
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Cunfer, 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004).
That is, time monitoring generally ensures more accurate responses within the prescribed
time constraints for a given time-based PM task.
Moreover, studies have consistently observed a unique pattern in time monitoring
behavior. This pattern becomes evident when the duration between each time-based
target is divided into multiple time intervals (e.g., 10 two-minute intervals preceding a
target) and typically reveals a U or J shape in time monitoring frequency during a given
set of intervals leading to the target event (Einstein et al., 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982).
In other words, people often monitor the time more frequently at the beginning of a task
then gradually monitor the time less frequently until the last interval, where there is a
spike in time monitoring. In addition, several studies have demonstrated that time
monitoring frequency during the last interval preceding the target time is more critical to
successful time-based PM performance than monitoring at other periods during the task
(Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Einstein et al., 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982). Thus, time
monitoring serves as a behavioral index of executive processing as it demonstrates the
control and allocation of attentional resources toward meaningful goals set in the future.
Prospective Memory Impairment and Clinical Disorders
Prospective memory can also be affected by other factors associated with various
clinical disorders. For instance, patients diagnosed with schizophrenia consistently show
PM impairment on event-, time-, and activity-based PM tasks (Wang et al., 2009).
Similar deficits have been observed among patients with a history of severe traumatic
brain injury (Shum, Valentine, & Cutmore, 1999). Children diagnosed with attentiondeficit hyperactive disorder have also demonstrated impairment on measures of PM
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(Kerns & Price, 2001). Moreover, people in both the preclinical and early stages of
Alzheimer’s disease show PM impairment compared to healthy older adults (Duchet,
Balota, & Cortese, 2006; Jones, Livner, & Bäckman, 2006).
More recently, factors related to mood disorders have generated attention in the
PM literature. Research investigating the role of affective states in PM performance has
yielded mixed results. Kliegel et al. (2005) found that sad mood impaired time-based PM
performance momentarily among a non-clinical sample. In contrast, Rummel, Hepp,
Klein, and Silberleitner (2012) found that sad mood increased PM performance whereas
positive mood decreased PM performance. More recently, Schnitzspahn et al. (2014)
found that both positive and negative mood states compromised young adults’ PM
performance on a time-based task, whereas older adults were unaffected by either mood
state. Although difficult to interpret, these inconsistent findings provide insight on
important clinical factors that may affect PM. These findings have also fostered
meaningful dialogue on the effects of depression on PM as well as the mechanisms
underlying PM and how they are compromised by depressed mood.
Depression and Prospective Memory
A large body of literature links depression with impairments in executive
functioning. In a review of 113 studies investigating executive functioning among
clinically depressed populations, Snyder (2013) found that major depressive disorder
(MDD) is related to broad deficits in executive functioning. For instance, patients with
MDD demonstrated deficits in inhibition, task shifting, and working memory—all of
which have been identified to play a role in PM (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Martin et al.,
2003; Mäntylä, Carelli, & Forman, 2007). Given what is known about the consequences
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of depression on executive functioning, it is likely that PM impairment is associated with
depressive symptoms. However, the existing literature provides somewhat inconclusive
support for that notion.
Event-based prospective memory and depression.
The existing body of literature investigating the effects of depression on eventbased PM has yielded mixed results. Several studies have documented depression-related
event-based PM impairment among clinical and non-clinical populations. Altgassen,
Kliegel, and Martin (2009) found that clinically depressed participants performed more
poorly on a non-focal event-based PM task. Chen, Zhou, Cui, and Chen (2013)
corroborated these findings among a sample of clinically depressed participants.
However, Li et al. (2013) did not find any impairment on an event-based PM task among
non-clinically depressed participants. Li, Loft, Weinborn, and Maybery (2014a) reported
that depressive symptomology was not related to event-based PM performance.
Similarly, Albiński, Kliegel, Sedek, and Kleszczewska-Albińska, (2012b) found that
event-based PM performance was not affected by depressive symptoms. In addition,
Altgassen, Henry, Bürgler, and Kliegel (2011) demonstrated that depression-related PM
deficits may depend on the context of the PM, specifically the emotional valance of the
PM cues. For instance, when Altgassen et al. (2011) manipulated the emotional valence
of PM cues using positive, negative, and neutral words, they found that PM performance
did not differ between the depressed and control group for neutral and negative PM cues.
However, when positive PM cues were implemented, only the control group showed a
significant increase in performance.
Time-based prospective memory and depression.
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Inconsistent findings also exist for the association between depression and timebased PM. In fact, findings from the current literature indicate that depression both
impairs and augments time-based PM. For example, Rude et al. (1999) observed that a
non-clinical sample of depressed participants performed more poorly on a time-based PM
task compared to healthy controls. Li, Weinborn Loft, and Maybery (2014b) observed
similar deficits among a non-clinical sample, and Li et al. (2013) also observed that
depression was related time-based PM impairments using a PM test developed
specifically for clinical use. In addition to finding overall deficits on a time-based PM
task, Li et al. (2013) observed that the impairments were greatest among the depressed
group when the delay interval for the PM increased. Implementing a naturalistic PM task,
Jeong and Cranney (2009) found that depression was negatively correlated with timebased PM performance among a non-clinical sample. However, the observed
impairments were specific to the timeliness of participants prospective remembering
rather than complete omission of the PM. In contrast, Albiński et al. (2012b) found that
depressive symptoms improved time-based PM among a non-clinical sample of younger
and older adults when compared to healthy controls.

Understanding the Varied Results
Several explanations have been given for the inconsistencies in the literature
surrounding the depression-related PM impairment. Li, et al. (2014b), noted that
depression severity may play an important role in depression-related deficits in PM. An
important distinction was made by these authors between their reports and that of
Albiński et al. (2012b), who found improved performance on a time-based PM task
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among depressed participants. This distinction occurs at the level of self-reported
depressive symptomology. Studies reporting deficits in time-based PM among depressed
participants have consistently reported mean Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores
that approach clinical populations (see Steer, Ball, & Rnieri, 1999), with scores ranging
from 24.8 (Rude et al., 1999) and 26.06 (Li et al., 2013) to 30.06 (Li et al., 2014).
However, in the Albiński et al. (2012b) study the mean BDI score observed among their
non-clinical sample of depressed participants was 16.3. Thus, it is possible that the
inconsistencies observed in time-based PM may be attributed to differences in symptom
severity, with clinical symptoms leading to poorer performance (Li et al., 2014b).
However according to Li et al. (2014b), it remains unclear why participants who are
mildly depressed experienced positive effects as well as improved time monitoring
behaviors compared to non-depressed controls in Albiński et al. (2012b).
Dysphoric Rumination: A Plausible Explanation?
One promising avenue for research in the area of depression and PM may be the
investigation of factors that potentially precipitate and exacerbate affective states. Over
the past two decades, considerable progress has been made in understanding rumination
and its relation to psychopathology. According to the ruminative response style theory,
rumination is characterized by persistent negative self-reflective thoughts about the
reasons for, and consequences of, a person’s depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
Recently, Treynor et al. (2003) identified two distinct styles of rumination—brooding
and reflection—that are each associated with a unique set of symptoms and cognitive
predispositions. For instance, brooding is more strongly associated with depression and
with a greater tendency to engage in self-criticism as well as a lower sense of mastery
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over important life events. Furthermore, brooding is generally characterized by a
maladaptive comparison of one’s circumstances to “some unachieved standard” (Treynor
et al., 2003, p. 256). In contrast, the reflection component is associated with depression to
a lesser extent than brooding and is characterized by a tendency to self-reflect on one’s
situation and actively engages in problem solving. This process of simultaneous selfreflection in response to negative affect and/or depressed mood may provide valuable
insight on the documented PM deficits among depressed people observed and clarify the
inconsistencies in the literature.
Regarding Li et al.’s (2014b) unresolved question about the positive effects of
depression on time-based PM documented in Albiński et al. (2012b), it is possible that
mildly depressed participants, particularly those coming from a non-clinical population,
engage in more ruminative reflection in response to depressed mood whereas those with
moderate to severe symptoms of depression tend to brood. Evidence from several studies
offer support for this speculation. For instance, the tendency to brood has consistently
been associated with depressive symptoms (Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008; Burwell & Shirk,
2007; Moulds et al. 2007; Treynor et al., 2003) and has been found to predict increases in
depressive symptoms over time (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). In
contrast, the relationship between reflection and depression symptoms has been generally
weak and modest at best (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Lo et al., 2008; Treynor et al., 2003).
Further support comes from Lo, Ho, and Hollon (2008) who speculated that the
modest relationship between reflection and depression observed in their study may be
related to the adaptive nature of this style of self-reflection. Burwell and Shirk (2007)
found that reflection was associated with adaptive coping strategies such as restructuring
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one’s attitude toward the stressors related to his or her depressed mood, which supports
what Lo, et al. (2008) speculated. In addition, Lo et al. (2008) speculated that the practice
of reflection may lower depressive symptoms among people who are experiencing low
levels of negative affect. Therefore, it is likely that people who are exhibiting fewer
symptoms of depression and ruminate in response to their depressed mood engage in
more self-reflection, which would activate adaptive coping strategies such as enhanced
allocation of attentional resources toward goal-directed behaviors. If true, this evidence
would support Albiński et al.’s (2012b) proposition that the positive effects of depression
on PM observed in their study could be driven by the analytical rumination hypothesis
(Andrews & Thompson, 2009), which presumes that depressed people, at least those who
exhibit mild symptoms of depression, engage in more self-reflective adaptive thinking
when depressed.
Rumination and Executive Functioning.
Studies investigating the consequences of rumination on neuropsychological test
performance have revealed impairments on tests of executive functioning, including
inhibition, perseveration, and set shifting (i.e., cognitive flexibility). Davis and NolenHoeksema (2000) were the first to examine the effects of rumination on executive
functioning and found that dysphoric ruminators (i.e., those ruminating while
experiencing negative affect) were more likely to exhibit deficits related to cognitive
flexibility. Specifically, dysphoric ruminators committed more perseverative errors and
failed to adapt to changes in their environment. Watkins and Brown (2002) were the first
to explore executive functioning among ruminators using the Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow (1993) response task and found that dysphoric ruminators exhibited impairments
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in inhibition. These findings have been replicated and extended by Philippot and Brutoux
(2008) who also found that dysphoric rumination was related to greater interference and
flexibility errors when compared to dysphoric distractors. Whitmer and Banich (2007)
also found that higher scores on a measure of trait rumination among depressed
participants were associated with a diminished capacity to inhibit previously relevant task
sets. Moreover, reported levels of depressed mood or worrying could not explain these
deficits.
Recent research suggests that rumination may be more detrimental to executive
functioning than general depressive symptoms. For instance, De Lissnyder, Koster, and
De Raedt (2011) found that rumination is associated with cognitive control impairments
when negative information was held in working memory. In contrast, depression was
unrelated to cognitive control impairments, suggesting that dysphoric ruminators may be
more susceptible to executive functioning impairments. In fact, Levens, Muhtadie, and
Gotlib (2009) found that brooding was associated with significant reductions in
controlling the allocation of cognitive resources to ongoing task demands, suggesting that
brooding may impair the controlled allocation of important cognitive resources. Thus, the
negative self-focus inherent to brooding may lead to executive functioning impairments
among dysphoric ruminators.
Given what is known about the cognitive consequences of rumination, it is
possible that the previously reported impairments in PM among depressed participants
may be driven in part by ruminative thoughts. Therefore, the aim of the current study is
three-fold. First, it will address the shortcomings of the Albinski et al. (2012b) study by
adding a measure of trait rumination as well as the Nolen-Hoeksema and Marrow (1993)

20

response task to induce rumination. Research has consistently demonstrated that this
manipulation significantly increases dysphoria among those who are currently dysphoric
compared to those who are not (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Second, by directly
testing the effects of rumination on PM, this study will provide additional insight into the
nature of PM deficits among depressed populations. Lastly, studies investigating PM
typically employ laboratory-based paradigms, which may limit the extent to which results
can be generalized to everyday settings—an inference that is of most importance given
the real-world implications of PM. Thus we will use an ecologically-valid, clinical
measure of PM, the Memory for Intentions Screening Test (MIST; Raskin, 2009;
Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006).
Given the findings from the investigations examining the relationship between
rumination and executive functioning impairments and what is known about the role of
executive functioning in PM performance, three hypotheses will be tested: first, it is
anticipated that participants exhibiting elevated symptoms of depression (i.e., moderate
and high) who undergo the rumination induction will make more time-based PM errors
compared to those in the distraction condition (H1); second, it is anticipated that
participants exhibiting elevated symptoms of depression who undergo the rumination
induction will make more errors on 15-minute compared to 2-minute delay event-based
PM trials, (H2); Lastly, it is anticipated that trait rumination will be negatively correlated
with PM performance across the entire sample (H3).
Method
Participants
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Participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students enrolled in an
introductory psychology course at the University of Montana and from the greater
community of Missoula Montana using print advertisements. Participants were screened
using the 8-item Patient Health Questionnnaire (PHQ-8). Those in the upper and lower
quartiles were invited to return to participate in the study. Participants were excluded
from the study if one or more of the following conditions were met: (1) reported use of
psychoactive drugs (e.g., benzodiazepines, narcotics, stimulants, or hallucinogens;
cannabis use was not exclusionary) within the past 5 days; (2) reported history of or
current diagnoses of any mental health disorder other than a mood disorder; (3) reported a
history of attention-defecit hyperactive disorder, traumatic brain injury (with a loss of
consciousness > 30 minutes), seizure(s), and/or dyslexia.
A total of 100 people participated in the study. Participants were compensated
with either course credit or $15.00 for their time. All participants provided informed
consent prior to completing any study-related procedures. Five participants were
excluded from the study due to exclusionary mental health conditions and/or
exclusionary psychoactive drug use within 5 days prior to entering the study. Three
participants’ data were discarded due to administration errors on the Memory for
Intentions Test (MIST) and one participant’s data was discarded due to a probable
language barrier that precluded the individual from understanding the MIST instructions.
Additionally, three participants’ data were excluded from analyses due to missing data on
the experimental manipulation check. Consequently, the remaining sample size for the
current study is 88. Participants were grouped into one of three groups according to their
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II) on the day of testing:
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Low (N = 55; BDI-II < 8), Moderate (N = 17; BDI-II 9-18), and High N = 16; BDI-II >
19).
Materials
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants completed a demographic
questionnaire using the online survey system, Qualtrics. The following demographic
information was collected from participants who met initial inclusion criteria: age,
biological sex at birth, and years of education. In addition, information concerning
medication and substance use as well as past and current psychiatric conditions was
gathered and used as exclusion criteria.
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-8). The PHQ-8 is an 8-item self-report
measure of depression that assesses depressive symptoms based on the DSM-IV major
depressive disorder criteria. This PHQ-8 is identical to the PHQ-9 except for item 9,
which is omitted because it addresses current suicide ideation. The PHQ-9 has
demonstrated excellent internal (.89) and test-retest (.84) reliability (Kroenke, Spitzer, &
Williams, 2001), and the PHQ-8 possesses similar psychometric characteristics (Kroenke
& Spitzer, 2002).
Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a reliable
and valid 21-item self-report measure of depression. The internal consistency of the BDIII is .92 (Beck, et al., 1996), and it has been used extensively in both clinical and research
settings.
Ruminative Responses Scale (RSS). The RRS is a subscale of the Response
Styles Questionnaire developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991). The RRS is a
22-item self-report measure of trait rumination. The internal consistency for the brooding
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and reflection factors is .77 and .72, respectively, and the test-retest reliability for each
factor is .62 and .60, respectively over a one-year follow up period (Treynor et al., 2003).
Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI). The momentary
ruminative self-focus inventory (MRSI) is a 6-item self-report measure of state
rumination (Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013; as cited in Hertel, Mor, Ferrari, Hunt, &
Agrawal, 2014). Example statements from the MRSI include, “right now, I am conscious
of my inner feelings” and “right now, I am thinking about the possible meaning of the
way I feel.” Hertel et al. (2014) demonstrated good internal consistency with the MRSI
(.81). The MRSI has also been shown to be sensitive to manipulations of self-focused
rumination (Mor et al., 2013; as cited in Hertel et al., 2014).
Response Task: Rumination Induction. The rumination induction response task
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) will be implemented to induce either
ruminative thoughts through a self-focus manipulation or to distract participants’
attention from their current emotional state. The rumination induction is designed to have
participants direct their attention to their thoughts in response to a variety of statements.
In each condition, participants will be asked to “think about” 45 thought-provoking
statements that differ in content depending on the assigned condition. For example,
participants assigned to the self-focused condition will be asked to read statements
intended to induce ruminative thoughts (e.g. “think about what your feelings might
mean” and “the possible consequences of the way you feel”) whereas those assigned to
the distraction condition will be asked to think about benign statements unrelated to the
self (e.g., “think about the layout of the local shopping center” and “the size of the
Golden Gate Bridge”).
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Memory for Intentions Screening Test (MIST). The memory for intentions
screening test (MIST, Raskin, 2004; as cited in Woods, Moran, Dawson, Carey, & Grant,
2008) is a standardized measure of event- and time-based PM. For the purpose of this
study, the research protocol of the MIST will be used (see Woods et al., 2008). The MIST
is comprised of 8 PM cues (4 event- and 4 time-based). The duration of the test is
approximately 30 minutes. For the event-based PM cues, participants are informed that
they will be asked to say or do certain things (e.g. “When I hand you a red pen, sign your
name on your paper”, “When I show you my tape recorder, tell me to rewind the tape”)
while completing a word search activity. In the word search activity, participants are
instructed to locate specific words presented at the bottom of the Word Search Form
(analogous to a crossword puzzle). The target words may be presented horizontally,
vertically, or diagonally within the Word Search form. For the time-based PM cue,
participants are instructed to say or carry out certain things at specific time points that
range from short to long delayed intervals (e.g. “In two minutes, please tell me two things
you forgot to do this past week”, and “In 15 minutes, use that paper to write the number
of medications you are currently taking”). In addition, there is an optional delayed PM
task that asks participants to call the researcher the following day to report how many
hours they slept that night. The MIST also contains a post-test multiple-choice activity
that assesses participants’ retrospective memory of the PM instructions, which has been
shown to discriminate PM performance from retrospective memory performance (Carey
et al., 2006; Woods et al., 2008). Several studies have illustrated the convergent validity
of the MIST with measures of executive functioning (Carey et al., 2006; Woods et al.,
2007).
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For the current study, modifications were made to the standard MIST
administration to acquire information regarding time monitoring and memory for
intentions. For example, monitoring activity was tracked for each participant, such that
examiners noted each time a participant checked the clock throughout the duration of the
test. Also, all PM test stimuli (e.g., pen, tape recorder, etc.) were removed from the table
and placed out of the participant’s view when either (a) they completed the PM task or
(b) after 1 minute. This was done to eliminate the possibility that the presence of an item
remaining on the table could serve as an additional reminder of an action to be executed
or an item to be recalled (i.e., in the recall test). Finally, free- and cued-recall tests were
created and administered to participants after completing the last MIST PM trial and prior
to the standard recognition test. For the free recall test, participants were given the
following instruction, “Please tell me each of the things that you were supposed to do
during this test.” If all trials were not freely recalled, they were then asked, “Is there
anything else?” After completing the free recall test, participants were administered the
cued-recall test and were given prompts about each trial. For both the free- and cuedrecall tests, separate subscales were created and one point was given for each trial
correctly recalled. Total scores for the free- and cued-recall subscales ranged from 0-8.
After completing the cued-recall test, the recognition test was administered verbally to
participants.
Procedure
This study was approved by the University of Montana Institutional Review
Board prior to recruiting participants. After the PHQ-8 screening, eligible participants
were invited to participate in the primary study. Following informed consent, participants
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completed all self-report measures and the rumination induction as follows:
demographics questionnaire, BDI-II, RRS, MRSI (time 1; T1), rumination induction (i.e.,
response task), and MRSI (time 2; T2). All self-report measures, except the BDI-II, and
the rumination induction were administered using the online survey platform, Qualtrics.
Following the MRSI T1, participants were randomly assigned to either the self-focused
(i.e. active rumination) or distraction condition. Following the rumination or distraction
condition, participants completed the MRSI T2, after which the MIST was administered
by a trained research assistant. All research assistants were blinded to the rumination
induction to prevent possible experimenter effects. All study procedures took
approximately sixty minutes to complete.
Results
Participant Characteristics
Participant demographic information along with depression and trait and state
rumination levels are displayed by group in table 1. Independent t-tests revealed that
groups did not differ significantly on age or education. Groups differed significantly from
each other on depression severity, trait rumination, and brooding. Those in the low group
had significantly lower scores on the MRSI T1 than those in high group, t(47.310) = 3.882, p = .000, who did not differ from the moderate group, t(27.782) = - .902, p = .375,
but were not statistically different from those in the moderate group t(70) = - 1.957, p =
.054. In addition, those in the low group differed significantly on the RRS reflection
factor than those in the moderate, t(18.106) = - 3.736, p = .002, and high, t(47.310) = 3.882, p = .000, groups, whereas those in the moderate and high groups did not differ
significantly from each other, t(31) = - 1.207, p = .237.
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Manipulation Check: Condition by Time
To determine if the rumination induction led to increased ruminative thinking, as
measured by the MRSI, a 2 (condition: induction vs. distraction) x 2 (time: MRSI T1 vs.
MRSI T2) repeated-measures mixed factorial ANOVA was performed. Rumination
condition was treated as the between-subjects factor whereas time was treated as the
within-subjects factor. A significant two-way interaction was found between rumination
condition and time, F(1, 89) = 12.64, p =.001, ²= .12, indicating that participants
assigned to the rumination induction reported greater state rumination at time 2 of the
MRSI compared to those assigned to the distraction condition. Using the Bonferroniadjusted alpha level for this two-way interaction, a statistically significant simple main
effect of condition was found at MRSI T2, F(1, 82) = 4.543, p = .000, ² = .052, but not
for MRSI T1, F(1,82) = .003, p = .957, ² = .000. Specifically, mean MRSI T2 scores
were significantly higher for participants in the rumination condition compared to those
assigned to the distraction condition, a mean difference (MD) of -3.632, 95% CI [-7.022,
-.242], p = .036. This result indicates that participants assigned to the rumination
induction reported more ruminative thoughts at MRSI T2 compared to those assigned to
the distraction condition, regardless of depression severity. All other interactions were
not significant (p > .05). Scores on the MRSI T1 and T2 were normally distributed for all
conditions per the Shapiro-Wilk test (p > .05) except for MRSI T1 for those assigned to
the rumination condition in the high group (p = .032).
Due to power limitations related to the small sample sizes of the moderate and
high groups, we conducted a series of t-tests to determine relations between condition and
time for each group. The results of a paired t-test revealed a significant difference in
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mean scores at T1 and T2 for the low group, t(26) = 5.115, p < .000, indicating that
participants assigned to the rumination induction reported greater state rumination
following the manipulation compared to those assigned to the distraction condition.
Although condition by time interactions were not observed for the moderate, F(1, 15) =
1.477, p = .243, ² = .090, or high groups, F(1, 14) = 2.410, p = .143, ² = .147,
additional paired t-tests were carried out for the moderate and high groups. Similar to the
low group, means scores on the MRSI increased significantly from T1 to T2 in the
moderate group for those in the rumination induction condition, MD of 3.0 (SD = 3.6
[95% CI, 0.036 – 5.964]), t(7) = 2.393, p < .048. No such effect was found for those who
underwent the rumination induction in the high group, t(7) = 0.887, p = .404.
Finally, independent t-tests were used to determine whether participants assigned
to the rumination induction condition in each group differed from each other at T2 of the
MRSI. No significant differences emerged on the MRSI T2 for the following group
comparisons: low vs. moderate, MD = - 2.713 (SE = 3.164; 95% CI [- 9.150 – 3.724]),
t(33) = - .858, p = .397; moderate vs. high, MD = 1.250 (SE = 2.374; 95% CI [- 3.841 –
6.341]), t(14) = .527, p = .607; low vs. high, MD = - 1.463 (SE = 2.210; 95% CI [- 6.023
– 3.097]), t(24.092) = - .662, p = .514.
Prospective Memory
Due to power limitations in the moderate and high depression groups, we briefly
present the results of analyses involving those groups, but also present analyses of the
low depression group by itself, for which we had a much larger sample.
Hypothesis 1
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To examine whether state rumination had a greater effect on time-based compared
to event-based PM in those exhibiting elevated symptoms of depression (H1), a 3 (group:
low vs. moderate vs. high) x 2 (condition: induction vs. distraction) x 2 (cue type: eventbased cue vs. time-based cue) repeated-measures mixed factorial ANOVA was
performed. Depression group and rumination condition were treated as between-subjects
factors and PM cue-type as a within-subjects factor. The three-way interaction between
depression group, rumination condition, and PM cue type was not significant F(2, 82) =
1.006, p = .370. A significant two-way interaction between condition and cue type was
found F(1,82) = 4.607, p = .035, suggesting that those in the distraction condition
performed better on time-based PM trials compared to those in the rumination condition
but not on event-based cues. Lastly, a significant main effect of cue type was found
F(1,85) = 36.675, p = .000, ² = .308. Post hoc tests using Bonferroni adjustment showed
that mean scores were higher on event-based compared to time-based PM trials, MD of
.937 (SE = .155, 95% CI [.629 – 1.246], p = .000) for all participants, regardless of
depression group and rumination condition.
Low Depression Group Only
The results of a 2 (condition: rumination vs. distraction) x 2 (cue type: eventbased cue vs. time-based cue) repeated-measures mixed factorial ANOVA revealed no
significant interaction between condition and cue type, F(1, 53) = .155, p = .695, ² =
.003. Consistent with analyses involving all participants, a significant main effect of cue
type was found, F(1, 53) = 34.209, p = < .001, ² = .392. Post hoc tests using Bonferroni
adjustment showed that performance was significantly higher on event-based trials
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compared to time-based trials, MD of 1.110 (SE = .190, 95% CI [.730 – 1.491], p = <
.001) regardless of rumination condition.
Hypothesis 2
To assess whether depression and state rumination interacted with PM cue type
and delay interval (H2), a 3 (group: low vs. moderate vs. high depressive symptoms) x 2
(condition: rumination vs. distraction) x 2 (cue type: event vs. time) x 2 (delay interval:
2-minute vs. 15-minunte) repeated-measures mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted.
Depression group and rumination condition were treated as between-subjects factors
while PM cue type and delay interval were treated as within-subjects factors. There was
no significant 4-way interaction between depression group, rumination condition, cue
type, and delay interval F(2, 82) = 1.807, p = .171, ² = .042.
A significant two-way interaction was revealed between cue type and delay
interval F(1, 82) = 33.320, p = .000, ² = .289. Specifically, participants’ PM
performance on event- and time-based 2-minute delay trials was almost identical,
whereas participants’ PM performance was worse on time-based 15-minute delay trials
compared to event-based 15-mintue delay trials. Moreover, a statistically significant
simple main effect of delay interval was found for time-based PM trials F(1, 82) =
61.022, p = .000, ² = .427, but not for event-based trials, F(1, 82) = .430, p = 514, ² =
.005. Specifically, mean time-based PM performance was higher for 2-minute delay trials
than for 15-minute delay trials, MD of .950, 95% CI [.708 – 1.192], p = 000. In addition,
a statistically significant main effect of cue type was found F(82, 1) = 36.547, p = .000,

² = .308, indicating that participants’ PM performance was better for event-based trails
compared to time-based trials. A statistically significant main effect of delay interval was

31

also found F(82, 1) = 55.358, p = .000, ² = .403, indicating that participants’ PM
performance was better for 2-minute delay interval trials compared to 15-minute delay
interval trials.
Low Depression Group Only
We ran similar analyses for the low group only. The results of a 2 (condition:
rumination vs. distraction) x 2 (cue type: event vs. time) x 2 (delay interval: 2-minute vs.
15-minunte) repeated-measures mixed factorial ANOVA did not reveal a significant
interaction between condition, cue type, and delay interval, F(1, 53) = .048, p = .828, ²
= .001. A significant interaction was found between cue type and delay interval, F(1, 53)
= 22.904, p = < .001, ² = .302, indicating that performance on 2-minute delay timebased trials was significantly higher than 15-minute delay time-based trials, MD of .962
(SE = .136, 95% CI [.690 – 1.234], p = < .001). No other significant interactions were
observed. Additionally, a significant main effect of delay interval, F(1, 53) = 62.956, p =
< .001, ² = . 543, revealed that PM performance was better for 2-minute than 15-minute
delay trials, MD of .535 (SE = .067, 95% CI [.400 – .671], p < .001).
We ran additional independent t-tests for event- and time-based as well as 2minute and 15-minute-delay interval PM trials. The assumption of equal variance was
met for all comparisons except for the 2-minute delay PM trials. A marginal difference
between the distraction and induction conditions approached significance on 2-minute
delay PM trials, MD of .262 (SE = .129, 95% CI [- .001 – .524]), t(34.746) = 2.027, p =
.050. Specifically, participants in the induction condition performed worse on 2-minute
delay PM trials than those in the distraction condition. No other significant differences
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were found between conditions on event-, t(53) = .504, p = .617, time-, t(53) = .671, p =
.505, and 15-minute delay, t(53) = .155, p = .877, PM trials.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3, that trait rumination would be negatively correlated with PM
performance, was not supported. Results revealed that trait rumination (i.e., RRS) was
not correlated with overall PM performance, r = .029, p = .787. Nor was the RRS and
overall PM performance significantly correlated in the high group, r =. 325, p = .219.
However, several significant correlations were found among the moderate and low
groups. For instance, the RRS was positively correlated with overall PM performance in
the moderate group (r = .508, p = .037). Similarly, the brooding factor of the RRS was
positively correlated (r = .591, p = .013) with overall PM performance in the moderate
group. In contrast, the RRS was negatively correlated with overall PM performance (r = .314, p = .020) in the low group. Specifically, the reflection factor of the RRS was
negatively correlated with both overall PM performance (r = - .329, p = .014) and eventbased trials (r = - .278, p = .040) in the low group. Additionally, both the MRSI T1 (r = .292, p = .031) and MRSI T2 (r = - .272, p = .044) were negatively correlated with timebased PM trials in the low group (see table 3).
Additional Analyses
Monitoring and Ongoing Task Performance. To determine whether depression
severity and state rumination affected time monitoring and ongoing task performance, a 3
(group: low vs. moderate vs. high) x 2 (condition: rumination induction vs. distraction)
ANOVA was carried out for each dependent variable, respectively. No significant
interaction between group and condition was found for monitoring performance F(2, 82)
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= .807, p = .450, ² = .019, or ongoing task performance, F(2, 82) = 1.091, p = .341, ² =
.026. No other significant interactions or main effects were found for monitoring or
ongoing task performance.
We also sought to determine whether condition had any effect on monitoring and
ongoing task performance in the low group only. Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed
no significant differences in monitoring performance between conditions, F(1, 53) =
.069, p = .793, or ongoing task performance, F(1, 53) = .738, p = .394, indicating that
state rumination had no effect on either dependent variable.
Retrospective Memory of PM Tasks. To determine whether depression severity
and state rumination affected retrospective memory of MIST PM tasks, a 3 (group: low
vs. moderate vs. high) x 2 (condition: rumination induction vs. distraction) ANOVA was
carried out for the free-, cued-, and recognition recall variables. No significant
interactions were found between group and condition for free-, f(2, 82) = .036, p = . 964,

² = .055, cued-, f(2, 82) = .151, p = .860, ² =.073, and recognition recall, f(2, 82) =
.026, p = .974, ² = .054. Lastly, no significant main effects were found for group or
condition on any of the retrospective memory variables.
Discussion
Accumulating evidence suggests that depression is associated with PM
impairment (Zhou et al., 2016). In addition, research shows that rumination can thwart
executive functions crucial for PM. However, it remains unknown whether depressiverumination contributes to documented depression-related PM impairment. Given the
negative effects of depressive-rumination on executive functions crucial for PM, we
manipulated state rumination in a non-clinical sample exhibiting low, moderate, and high
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symptoms of depression. We hypothesized that participants in the moderate and high
groups who were induced to ruminate would perform more poorly on time-based (H1)
and 15-minute delay event-based PM trials (H2). Lastly, we expected that trait
rumination would be negatively correlated with overall PM performance (H3).
Regarding H1, induced state rumination had no effect on time-based PM
compared to those in the distraction condition across all three depression groups (H1).
This finding remained even when the moderate and severe groups were excluded from
analyses. Moreover, induced state rumination had no effect on overall PM performance
regardless of depression severity.
Although Li et al. (2013) found that depressed participants performed more
poorly on time-based and 15-minute delay trials compared to event-based and 2-minute
delay trials, respectively, no such interactions were found in the current study (H2).
These findings also conflict with Rude et al. (1999), who reported depression-related PM
impairment on time-based PM tasks. However, the aforementioned null findings are not
entirely inconsistent with previous research.
The finding that no relation was observed between depressive symptoms and
event-based PM is consistent with prior research. For instance, previous work has not
revealed depression related event-based PM deficits (Albiński et al., 2012b; Li et al.,
2013, 2014). One possible explanation for this effect relates to the nature of the MIST
event-based trials. Specifically, cues may be more focal, requiring fewer executive
resources to carry out. Although Li et al. (2013) argue that the MIST event-based trials
are non-focal due to a delay-interval effect on event-based trials, no such effect was
found in our study. It is likely that the qualities of MIST event-based stimuli are, instead,
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highly salient. For instance, asking participants sign their name on their paper when they
are handed a red pen is less likely to require effortful retrieval of the intention (i.e.,
signing name) when the cue is encountered (i.e., seeing the red pen). Thus, the finding
that depressive symptoms were not related to event-based PM is consistent with existing
research and PM theory.
Our third hypothesis, that trait rumination would be negatively correlated with
overall PM, was not supported when looking at the entire sample. However, several
significant and notable correlations were found when depression severity (e.g., low,
moderate, and high) was analyzed separately. For instance, in the low group, both trait
and state rumination were negatively correlated with PM performance. Specifically,
higher trait rumination, especially reflection, was negatively correlated with overall PM
performance. In addition, elevated state rumination as evidenced by the MRSI T2, was
negatively correlated with time-based PM trials. In contrast, trait rumination was
positively correlated with PM for those in the moderate group. For example, trait
rumination, especially brooding, was related to better overall PM performance.
Although the current findings related to rumination, depression, and memory are
at odds with much of the published literature, in which negative relations between
rumination and memory are more commonly observed only in the context of depression,
we offer two explanations for our results. First, rumination is a broad construct with
several varieties, and its negative consequences are not necessarily limited to depressed
mood. For instance, Whitmer and Banich (2007) found that angry rumination and
intellectual ruminations were related to problems with cognitive flexibility, whereas
depressive-rumination, specifically brooding and reflection, was related to impaired
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inhibition. In addition, Whitmer and Banich (2010) found that ruminations unrelated to
depressed mood were related to decreased inhibition of irrelevant material from long term
memory (LTM). The latter findings are particularly relevant given that an inability to
inhibit irrelevant information from LTM may potentiate the retrieval of similar, but taskirrelevant information (Whitmer & Banich, 2010). If true, ruminations in general may (a)
lead to the retrieval of task-irrelevant information and/or (b) interfere with the retrieval of
task-relevant information needed to execute the correct future intention. The latter may
explain why trait and state rumination was negatively correlated with PM performance
for participants in the low group. Further support for this notion comes from a marginal
and near significant finding that those who underwent the rumination induction in the low
group exhibited worse performance on 2-minute delay PM trials. However, this induction
effect was not found for any other MIST PM variables (e.g., event- and time-based PM)
in the low group, which remains curious. Alternatively, it is possible that the negative
correlations found between PM performance and both trait and state rumination in the
low depression group may have been the result of other more general ruminations
thwarting the retrieval of relevant PM instructions. Although plausible, this is assertion is
speculative because we did not include any additional measures of rumination.
Second, amounting evidence indicates that rumination may confer positive
benefits to cognition. For instance, Smallwood et al. (2003) found that when high trait
ruminators are experiencing elevated symptoms of depression they are more likely to
direct their attention to monitoring ongoing task performance. Moreover, this increased
focus on task performance is thought to be adaptive such that ruminating about ongoing
task performance will minimize future failure and subsequent distress. Similarly,
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Altamirano et al. (2010) found that higher trait rumination was related to better goalmaintenance in a sample of people exhibiting elevated symptoms of depression (mean
BDI-II of 19.8). Therefore, it is possible that a proclivity to ruminate as measured by the
RRS in conjunction with sub-clinical symptoms of depression may be contextually
adaptive and confer functional benefits, especially when the task at hand does not require
a great deal of mental flexibility and objectives are consistent across time. Taken
together, such an explanation is consistent with Albiński et al. (2012b), who found that
sub-clinical depression was found to enhance PM and speculated that depressiverumination may have increased depressed participants’ focus on task performance to
minimize task errors and rectify their depressed mood.
The lack of evidence supporting our hypotheses and the significant correlations
found among the low and moderate groups need to be interpreted cautiously given the
low statistical power of the current study due to small sample sizes for the moderate and
high depressive groups. This issue of power is especially pertinent to the effects of the
experimental manipulation of state rumination. For instance, our analyses revealed no
group by condition interactions between the pre- and post-manipulation measures.
However, when pre- and post-manipulation measures were analyzed separately for each
group, we found significant increases in state rumination effects for those in the low and
moderate groups, but not the high group. As noted above, this outcome is inconsistent
with previous research (Nolen-Hoeksema, Blair, & Lyubomirsky 2008). To our
knowledge, this is the first study to observe such an effect using this rumination
induction. Although the number of participants in the moderate and high groups were
low, mean scores on the manipulation check (i.e., MRSI T2) trended in the expected
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direction with those assigned to the induction condition scoring higher on the MRSI T2 in
both groups. Thus, the finding that depression severity (i.e., low, moderate, and high) was
unrelated to significant changes in ruminative thoughts in those assigned to the induction
condition may be a consequence of low statistical power because previous research has
shown that the MRSI is sensitive to changes in state rumination using the same induction
procedure employed in this study (Mor et al., 2013; as cited in Hertel et al., 2014).
Additionally, it is possible that those in the moderate and high groups were
already in a heightened state of rumination at the time they entered the study.
Specifically, participants in the low group scored substantially lower on the MRSI T1
than those in the moderate and high groups. However, participants assigned to the
rumination induction reported almost the same level of state rumination per their scores
on the MRSI T2 across all three groups. In fact, there was no significant group
differences on the MRSI T2. Thus, those with elevated symptoms of depression may
have already been actively ruminating when they entered the study, especially those in
the high depressive symptom group. If this was indeed the case, the experimental
rumination induction used in this study may only be effective at increasing ruminative
thoughts to a degree, which could explain why MRSI T2 scores were equivalent across
all three rumination induction groups.
The fact that participants assigned to the rumination induction in the low group
reported a similar state of rumination comparable to those assigned to the same condition
in the moderate and high groups remains curious. It is possible that the ruminative
thoughts among those in the low group may have been directed toward benign content
that was less distressing and more reflective in nature. Related to this point, we found a
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significant, though marginal, positive correlation between scores on the MRSI T2 and the
reflection items on the RRS. This relationship may be suggestive of increased reflective
rumination among participants who underwent the rumination induction in the low group.
Moreover, the MRSI appears to contain only one item that taps ‘brooding’ content. It is
possible that the rumination induction increased brooding that was not captured by the
MRSI. Given the relationship between the MRSI T2 and the reflection factor of the RRS,
the MRSI may not be a robust measure of state rumination, which would limit its ability
to detect state changes in brooding.
Another important limitation of the current study pertains to the reliance of selfreported depressive symptoms, especially in a non-clinical depression. It is crucial to
distinguish between clinical (i.e., those meeting criteria for a formal psychiatric
diagnosis) and non-clinical depressed populations (i.e., individuals who endorse elevated
depressive symptoms per self-report measures such as the BDI-II without a formal
diagnosis; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010). For instance, clinically depressed individuals
consistently show executive control deficits for negative compared to positive-valanced
material (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), whereas this finding is less robust among nonclinical samples. Furthermore, results from the current study highlight this discrepancy
given that depression-related PM impairment has been evidenced in a clinical sample
(e.g., Rude et al., 1999). To further complicate matters, Galatzer-Levy and Bryant (2013)
showed that there are approximately 227 possible combinations of MDD per DSM-5
criteria. Thus, there is room for considerable heterogeneity even within clinical samples.
Going forward, future research would benefit from relying less on dichotomizing
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continuous variables when non-clinical samples are used because such practices weakens
statistical power and can contribute to erroneous results (Cohen, 1983).
Notwithstanding these limitations, the current study contributes to our knowledge
of depression and PM. First, this is the first study to include measures of both trait and
state rumination. The only other study to date (i.e., Albiński et al., 2012b) that considered
the effects of depressive-rumination on PM did not include any measures of trait or state
rumination. Second, to our knowledge this is the first study to include a measure of
monitoring behavior and tests of free- and cued-recall for MIST PM trials in addition to
the standard recognition memory trial. The inclusion of these measures provide a more
complete picture of the executive functions involved in PM as well as the contributions
made by retrospective memory. Measures of free recall, especially following a delay,
represent a more strategic and effortful cognitive activity because unlike cued recall and
recognition, there are no external stimuli to guide the retrieval of previously encoded
experiences. In the present study, we did not find any significant differences between
depression severity and monitoring behavior or performance on free-, cued-, or
recognition memory. Moreover, no significant relations emerged between the rumination
induction and any of these measures, regardless of depression severity. These findings are
consistent with some literature investigating the relations between depression and
episodic memory performance (Beblo et al., 2017; O’Jile et al., 2005), but not with others
(Hermens et al., 2010; Lyche et al., 2010).
Future Directions
The current study is the first to address the effects of depressive-rumination on
PM in a non-clinical sample composed primarily of undergraduate students. Although
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addressing an important gap in the literature, additional research is required to: (a)
replicate our findings, (b) address the shortcomings of our study, and explore other
important factors that may affect PM in people exhibiting depressive symptoms.
Future research will need to further explore the effects of depressive-rumination
on PM among clinically depressed populations. To date, most studies investigating the
effects of depression on PM have relied on non-clinical populations. It is well known that
clinical and non-clinical populations may differ in performance of tests of cognitive
function (e.g., executive function). Thus, more research is needed to determine whether
PM and related cognitive functions are indeed impaired in individuals who meet criteria
for MDD. It will also be critical to consider how depression status (i.e., current major
depressive episode or in remission) affects PM. In addition, it remains unknown whether
depressive ruminations will confer positive effects on PM performance in clinically
depressed patients.
Another crucial area to explore pertains to the type of ruminations people engage
in when experiencing negative or positive mood states, and how each contributes to PM
performance. As noted in the previous section, there are several distinct varieties of
rumination (e.g., brooding, reflection, anger, and intellectual) with each affecting
cognition in different ways. Therefore, future research in this area will need to account
for these different ruminative styles and determine whether any dissociable effects exist
regarding PM.
Clinical Application
Although the relationship between rumination and PM remains ambiguous,
research to date indicates that depression is associated with impaired PM (McFarland &
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Vasterling, in press; Zhou et al., 2016). In addition, research consistently demonstrates
that rumination, especially among individuals with depression, is related to executive
function impairment (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Clinical interventions, such as
mindfulness-based cognitive interventions, targeting ruminative tendencies among
patients with depression have shown considerable promise in minimizing depressiverumination and depressive symptoms (Ramel, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004; Deyo,
Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009). Moreover, mindfulness-based interventions have been
found to improve executive functions related to response inhibition, cognitive flexibility,
and working memory (Gallant, 2016). Based on this literature, if depressive-rumination
does indeed thwart executive functions that are crucial for PM and mindfulness-based
therapies are effective at restoring executive functions, then such interventions may also
confer positive benefits for PM. This would be a fruitful area for future research given the
documented PM impairment in individuals experiencing depression.
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Appendix A
Table 1
Participant Characteristics
Low
Moderate
High
Female n (%)
40 (72.7)
12 (70.6)
15 (93.8)
Age
21.3 7.5)
19.0 (1.1)
25.6 (14.8)
Education
13.1 (1.7)
13.4 (0.9)
13.3 (1.7)
Racea n (%)
49 (89.1)
17 (100.0)
15 (93.8)
b
Language n (%)
53 (96.4)
17 (100.0)
16 (100.0)
Anxiety n (%)
1 (1.8)
2 (11.8)
2 (12.5)
Antidepressant n (%)
5 (9.1)
1 (5.9)
5 (31.3)
Cannabis n (%)
1 (1.8)
2 (11.8)
2 (12.5)
Note: Means and (standard deviations) are reported unless indicated otherwise.
a
= White
b
= English
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Appendix B
Table 2
Participant Characteristics
Low
Moderate
High
BDI-II
3.8 (2.6)
13.8 (3.4)
30.4 (8.5)
RRS
30.0 (5.5)
45.4 (10.6)
56.9 (7.8)
Brooding
7.0 (1.6)
9.9 (2.4)
12.7 (2.4)
Reflection
6.8 (1.6)
10.1 (3.6)
11.4 (2.6)
MRSI T1
25.2 (7.2)
29.0 (5.9)
30.6 (3.9)
Note: Means and (standard deviations) are reported.
BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition; RRS = Ruminative Response
Scale; MRSI T1 = Momentary Rumination Self-Focused Inventory Time 1.
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Appendix C
Table 3
Bivariate Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Low Group
MRSI MRSI
TBPM
RRS Brooding Reflection
T1
T2
PM
Total
RRS
r
1
.723**
.681**
.244 .351** -.305* -.314*
Sig.
.000
.000
.072
.009
.024
.020
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
**
**
Brooding
r
.723
1
.427
.255
.238 -.256
-.255
Sig.
.000
.001
.060
.080
.059
.061
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
**
**
Reflection r
.681
.427
1
.263
.260 -.230 -.329*
Sig.
.000
.001
.052
.055
.091
.014
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
**
*
MRSI T1
r
.244
.255
.263
1 .791
-.292
-.301*
Sig.
.072
.060
.052
.000
.031
.026
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
MRSI T2
r
.351**
.238
.260 .791**
1 -.272*
-.243
Sig.
.009
.080
.055
.000
.044
.074
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
*
*
*
TB-PM
r
-.305
-.256
-.230 -.292
-.272
1 .906**
Sig.
.024
.059
.091
.031
.044
.000
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
*
*
*
**
PM Total
r
-.314
-.255
-.329
-.301
-.243 .906
1
Sig.
.020
.061
.014
.026
.074
.000
N
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
RRS = Ruminative Response Scale; MRSI T1 & T2 = Momentary Rumination SelfFocused Inventory time 1 and time 2; PM Total = overall prospective memory
performance; TB-PM = time-based prospective memory trials.
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